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For Labour Day 2003 the National
Post published a series of articles
gloating over the travails of the
Canadian labour movement (Brieger
2003; Corcoran 2003; Milhar 2003a
and b). The articles reported on a
poll commissioned by the
notoriously anti-union Union Watch
but conducted by Leger Marketing.
The Post claimed, among many
other things disturbing to unions,
that organised labour’s share of
Canadian workers had dropped
dramatically from the 1970s, that a
large majority of non-union
employees did not want a union and
that only about ¼ of union members
are “very satisfied” with their
union’s representation of their
interests.
Many of the poll questions and
much of the Post’s analysis were
driven by antipathy to unions, it is
true. The poll results do not always
support the conclusions that the Post
draws. It is also interesting to note
that among union members polled,
81% want to stay in their unions (the
exact same proportion of non-
unionists who reject unions). An
earlier poll by Americans Richard
Freeman and Joel Rogers (1999) calls
some of the Canadian results into
question.  In their American poll, the
authors found 32% of non-union
employees would choose a union.
Does this make Canadians more
anti-union than Americans?  More
importantly, Freeman and Rogers
found a powerful desire among
workers for representation of their
interests in the workplace.  Over half
of the workers polled wanted more
influence in their workplace than they
actually had.1 Whether such influence
could be achieved through unions or
not is a challenge to unions.
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My main purpose here is not to
quarrel with the National Post
articles.  There is enough truth in
what they report to make thoughtful
Canadian trade unionists and
supporters of trade unions think
deeply and uncomfortably about the
future.  But amid the bad news are
many encouraging signs if only
unions will rise to the challenge.
Can they rise to the challenge?
As a former trade union organiser
and now industrial relations
academic, I myself have been
thinking long and hard about these
questions.  As with any difficult and
complex question, sometimes it is
useful to get above the myriad of
facts and figures and try to think
conceptually about the problem.
What follows is a modest
intellectual framework that may
help explain recent losses in union
membership and approaches to
future organising challenges.
The model takes its inspiration
from John Godard’s Industrial
Relations: Economy and Society, a
book I have used in my teaching of
introductory industrial relations
courses. Godard puts forward a two-
by-two matrix categorising
management policies and practices
(Godard 2000, 108-138, but page 111
in particular.)
As I used this model with my
classes, I changed it, to simplify and
make it more a reflection of the
dynamic between workers and
management and less a typology of
management.  Then I overlaid a
second dimension beyond Godard’s
management styles.  This involved
finding where trade unions are most
likely to be found, the “union zone.”
The corollary to the “union zone”
is a “non-union zone.”  Why are
unions seldom found here?  What
strategies might unions use to
expand into them and what
strategies do employers use to
resist?
What seemed to emerge was a
strategic blueprint of the contested
terrain of unionisation.
The model begins from the
premise that all employers have two
fundamental problems in
“employing”2 labour: the quality of
labour power and maintaining order
in the workplace.
THE QUALITY OF LABOUR
POWER (QLP)
All employers need to be concerned
that their workforce is skilled,
healthy, educated, robust and
motivated enough to do the work
required in their particular
workplace.  Employers have always
differed in the quantum of their own
resources they put into the QLP.
Some choose to invest a lot in their
QLP; others choose to invest very
little.
What made the earliest capitalism
so dynamic compared to preceding
economic regimes is that it relieved
employers of legal obligation to
provide workers anything beyond a
wage for hours worked.  A capitalist
did not need much wealth to start
with nor was he burdened with the
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maintenance, protection or overhead
costs of the human beings who
worked for him.  He could start
small, and take on or lay off labour
in marginal amounts.
Yet almost as soon as capitalism
began, this laissez-faire arrangement
proved as problematic as it was
fortuitous.  Some employers soon
found that providing part of
workers’ overhead costs reaped
greater productivity.   Other
employers were animated by
religious or humanitarian motives.
So, even from the earliest days of
capitalism, some employers
provided housing, schooling, health
care, better pay and benefits and
indemnity against catastrophic
cessation of the ability to work.
Moreover, some groups of
employees, even in those early days,
could unite into unions to force their
employer away from naked
exploitation.
Of course, other employers would
offer as little as possible, leaving it
mainly to the workers, their
organisations (unions and friendly
societies), and the workers’
communities to palliate the rigours
of life in factory and home.
Moreover, even the “good”
employers might revert to this
model given a change in whim,
ownership or economic conditions.
However, the variance between
those employers who provided and
those who did not was not efficient
for the development of modern
industrial state.  The problem of the
quality of labour power moved
beyond the realm of the individual
capitalist into the realm of the
collective capitalist.
In modern industrial economies a
general level of health care, public
health provision and education (at
least to the end of secondary school)
among the population became
essential.  Moreover, “good”
employers increasingly resented in
effect, subsidising “bad” employers.
And so the state began to take over
this subsidy to capital.  Important
basic amenities like education,
health care, unemployment
insurance, pensions and sickness
and accident compensation were
provided from a combination of
taxation, worker premiums and
employer premiums.3
However, even in the modern era,
the state has never provided the full
quantum of amenities that
employees or employers needed.
Moreover, since the highwater mark
of the “welfare state” in the 1970s,
the state itself has retreated in all
industrialised countries.  So the
provision of amenities to improve
the quality of labour power is still
very much a problem for employers
and employees.  And it is still a
subject of negotiation between
employers and workers.
THE PROBLEM OF WORKPLACE
ORDER
The second problem for all
employers is the maintenance of
workplace order.  As simple as the
operation of an enterprise might be,
66   JUST LABOUR vol. 3 (Fall 2003)                                                                                Debates
no employer can afford to reinvent
the workplace every morning.  Even
the least skilled workers need to be
ready and willing to begin work
every shift without being re-told
precisely what to do.  No matter
how unskilled the workforce, no
matter how much power the
employer can wield, no matter how
coercive the workplace regime,
order is not assured.  Because
workers can refuse to co-operate.
And if they do, then the employer’s
enterprise will falter and perhaps
fail.
Think, for example, of work
environments where the employer
has tremendous power.  In slave
labour camps and prison
workshops, a refusal by workers to
co-operate may result in punishment
for workers but can also result in
production problems.  Even the
most restrictive and high-security
jail cannot run effectively without
the co-operation of the inmates.  The
Wooden World (Rodger 1986)
contains an excellent discussion of
discipline and order in the British
navy of the Seven Years War period
(1755-63) challenging the
conventional wisdom that life on
board was full of oppressive officers,
vicious punishment, poor rations
and misery.  From ample
contemporary documentation, it
finds that, despite recruitment by
press gangs and complete isolation
at sea, sailors were relatively well-
treated and discipline was relaxed,
even by today’s standards.
Indeed, there is a sizeable
literature on the subject of consent in
industrial relations and work
sociology (Burawoy 1979, 1987;
Chun 2001; Collinson 1994; Edwards
1986; Haiven 1994, 1991; Manwaring
and Wood 1985).
The point is that just because an
employer has the physical
opportunity to use unalloyed
coercion to run the workplace does
not necessarily mean that it can be
done.  Order comes at a price.
THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION
Maintaining quality of labour power
and workplace order in sufficient
amount are achieved through a
process of negotiation between
employer and employee(s).
Negotiation is not synonymous with
collective bargaining.  That is merely
a more sophisticated and legally-
protected form of what goes on at
lower levels.  Employers negotiate at
several different levels: with a)
individual workers, b) groups of
workers and c) groups of workers
through unions.
By negotiation we mean the
trading of favours, indulgences and
effort.  In every workplace,
unionised or not, every day, every
hour, negotiation goes on.  Some
workplaces have a lower level;
others have a very high level.  But
there is always negotiation.
The state may make this
negotiation easier or more difficult
depending on the amenities it itself
provides and on the power and
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vehicles it offers employees to carry
on these negotiations.
THE MATRIX OF NEGOTIATION
We can think of the vector of
negotiation as proceeding amid a
matrix that depicts the employer-
worker relationship.  The matrix
consists of two dimensions.
The vertical dimension is called
“worker autonomy.”  This measures
the extent to which workers have
personal control over their work.  At
the lower extreme, they have no
control and are subject to constant
instruction and supervision by their
employer.  At the upper extreme,
they have complete control, not
supervised at all.  They may even
work outside the employer’s
premises, in their own premises.
The horizontal dimension is called
“employer solicitude to employee
needs and concerns.”  This measures
the extent to which the employer
must engage in providing amenities
which workers want or need.  At the
lower extreme, the employer
provides little in the way of
amenities.  At the upper extreme,
the employer is exceedingly
concerned about keeping the
workers indulged and happy.
In our model the negotiation
vector moves diagonally through the
matrix, with “low negotiation” at the
bottom left and “high negotiation”
at the upper right.  i.e. at the lower
left, where worker autonomy and
employer solicitude are low, the
need to negotiate is low; at the
upper right, where worker
autonomy and employer solicitude
are high, the need to negotiate is
very high.
When we combine these two
dimensions, we can place various
types of work environment at
different spots on the matrix.
In the upper left area are workers
completely outside of the
employment relationship.  They are
contract workers.  They are highly
autonomous in that the employer
does not supervise them except for
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delivering the specifications of the
work required.  They rely on their
own expertise to complete the job.
However, in this case, the employer
needs to offer no solicitude about
their wants and needs. The only
amenity the employer provides is
payment for the specific product or
service produced.  All overhead
costs are borne by the worker.
Contract workers may be highly
skilled, (e.g. accountants, web
designers, graphic artists) less
skilled, (automobile mechanics,
plumbers) or low skilled (contract
cleaners).  They have in common
their work outside of the
employment relationship.  What
varies is the degree of specification
by the employer necessary for them
to complete their contract.
What makes contract workers
especially difficult (and sometimes
impossible) to unionise is the
missing legal employment
relationship.  The vast majority of
jurisdictions in Canada allow only
employed people to be unionised.
Theoretically contract workers can
band together and attempt to
negotiate with their “employer.”
But there is usually no legal recourse
if the employer refuses to deal with
them.  Moreover, so long as the
employer pays them for the specific
job(s) they have been retained to do
(or pays them off in advance), the
employer owes them nothing more
under common law.
What also makes them difficult to
organise is their isolation and
independent-mindedness.  While
not all of them choose to work alone,
there is often a sense of pride in
privacy.  Moreover, their non-
employment gives them some
tactical tax advantages.
At the lower left we have the
classic sweatshop.  Employees are
under close supervision, with little
discretion.  And the employer
provides little in the way of
amenities.  But even groups of ditch
diggers or simple factory assemblers
are not totally without negotiation
resources as their non-co-operation
can hamstring the employer.
At the upper right we have quite
the opposite -- a very special type of
work environment - what might be
called the "very high tech, very high
skill" workplace.  Here workers are
very autonomous -- with skill levels
over and above those available even
to their employer, making the
employer very dependent upon
their knowledge. The boss must also
be extremely concerned with their
welfare.  Indeed, at the extreme, the
needs of these workers and their
ability to demand satisfaction might
earn them the moniker "prima
donnas."
An example might be a group of
very highly skilled computer
program designers working on a
new product.  Their employer relies
heavily on their knowledge and
initiative.
The employer in the upper right
corner must strive to know and
attempt to satisfy not only the
collective needs of these workers but
perhaps more importantly their
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individual needs.  Imagine a group of
dot.com techno-dweebs beavering
away throughout the night on a new
software project.  Each has a
different junk food addiction - one
likes frozen Mars® Bars, another
Nacho Cheesier Doritos®, another
Choco-Leibniz® cookies. While it
might be an annoying inconvenience
for an ordinary employer to provide
workers with such delicacies, the
boss here gladly provides these
snacks, even in the middle of the
night, so that the prima donnas can
keep working and producing value.
Toward the top middle, we have
traditional craft workers, like
tradespeople (e.g. carpenters,
plumbers, millwrights.)  They have a
high degree of skill and autonomy.
But they are still either in a legal
employment relationship or are
under the effective care or control of
their employer.  The employer has a
middling concern with these
workers’ needs.
Along the bottom of the matrix,
we have workplaces whose denizens
have less skill and exercise
considerably smaller degrees of
discretion.  Toward the left we have
workplaces where the employer
shows little concern with workers’
well-being.  At the far left, we have a
traditional sweatshop.  At the far
right, we have paternalistic
employers of the old school,
employing low-skilled workers but
offering a high level of amenities.
These might be remnants of
paternalistic companies from
yesteryear (e.g. the Quaker chocolate
firms in the UK) or those whose
owners have developed paternalism
more recently.
In the bottom middle, we have the
bulk of the personal service and
small manufacturing sector, where
the employer exercises middling
concern for employee welfare.
THE UNION ZONE
It is now time to add “the union
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zone.”  The union zone looks
somewhat like a rounded triangle,
with its apex at the top, found near
the top middle of the matrix.
Alternatively, the “non-union zones”
would be in the upper left corner,
the upper right corner and most of
the bottom area.
We know that there is some
correlation between unionisation
and the need for negotiation.  We
have already postulated that
negotiations take place not only with
unions but also their absence.  We
also know that employees have
more power to negotiate if they take
advantages of the power and legal
protections that unions afford them.
But does that mean that unions are
likely to be found in the upper right,
where negotiation is at its height?
Not necessarily. It depends on the
content of what can be negotiated
and on the relative openness of the
workplace to unionisation.
The content of negotiations can be
divided into individual issues, those
exclusive from one worker (or small
group) to the next e.g. leaves of
absence, pay for individual
performance and training based on
skill and collective issues those more
amenable to negotiation en masse
e.g. basic education pay, benefits,
pension plans, grievance
procedures, just cause for discipline
etc.
The relative openness of a given
workplace to union organising
depends on three major factors: how
much workers need and want a
union; how much resistance
employers are willing to put up to
unionisation; and how much unions
need and want to organise the
workers.  All three in turn depend
on the content of negotiations.  How
might these factors affect the
location of the union (and the non-
union) zone?
As the negotiation vector rises
through the matrix, the need of
workers for unions rises.  But that
need reaches a peak not at the upper
right but near the middle of the
matrix, where the issues in dispute
are mostly collective.  Workers have
some skills and hence bargaining
power, but they are able to bargain
more readily as a group, by
threatening to withhold their skills
en masse.  They have little
individual power to demand
individual attention from the
employer.
As the negotiation vector rises
further, into the upper right corner,
the issues become more
individualised.  In the upper right,
the workers are so skilled
individually and the threat of
withdrawal of their labour
individually so powerful that the
need for a collective organisation
drops.
But the need and desire of workers
for a union is not the only
determinant of unionisation.
Another important factor is the will
of the employer to resist
unionisation.  Few employers of any
type actively desire and fewer still
seek unionisation.  But there are
differences in the extent to which
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employers will resist unionisation.
Employer resistance to unions might
be said to be lowest where the union
performs a useful function for the
employer.  In the middle of our
matrix, where employers must
negotiate collective benefits with
their workers, unions can and do
play a useful function for employers.
The time and effort required of
employers to negotiate individually
those amenities that are mostly
collective can be a drain on
employers.  By taking over the
details and much of the work of
formulating employee concerns and
of filtering out the more frivolous
demands, unions can be very helpful
to employers in this area of our
matrix.  This fact may not induce
employers to welcome unions with
open arms.  But it does alter the cost-
benefit calculus of opposing
unionisation.
Employers are most ready to
oppose unionisation at the lower
part of our matrix as the “union
effect” on employee compensation is
greatest (and hence the benefit of
keeping the union out) greatest
among the lowest-skilled and
lowest-paid (Card, Lemieux, and
Riddell, 2003).
The final factor in unionisation is
the willingness of unions themselves
to organise a given group of
workers.  While it is dangerous to
ignore the altruistic and solidaristic
reasons unions have for organising a
group of workers, it is also
dangerous to underestimate the
cost-benefit equation that unions
must calculate in making organising
decisions.  The more that the
benefits exceed the costs, the more
enthusiastic unions will be.  The
smaller the gap between costs and
returns, the less enthusiastic they
will be.  And if the costs outweigh
the benefits, unions can be
downright hesitant about
organising.
Unions and their activists made
many sacrifices against fierce
employer resistance to organise the
industrial unions of the 1930s, 40s
and early 50s.  But once they broke
through, the industrial union or
“Wagner model”4 seemed to work
well.  A successful campaign in a
typical industrial workplace of that
era delivered hundreds, thousands,
and sometimes tens of thousands of
workers – mostly male, mostly
white.  After the initial shakedown
cruise that might involve a strike,
the first contract would be signed.
The dues checkoff spelled instant
security.  The collective agreement
provided collective benefits for a
mass of workers.  The law protected
unions’ right to organise workplaces
of this type.  While maintenance of
this model might involve the
occasional strike, it worked for
unions for a long time.
This type of unionism has been
called, perhaps unfairly, “business
unionism.”  It is true that it resulted
in a drop in union militancy during
the forty-year post-war period in
which unions were accepted as part
of the mainstream of North-
American life.  The point is that it
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worked while it lasted.  But that
period has long passed and the
employer offensive against trade
unions has been the norm for the
past two and a half decades.  The
tragedy is that old habits die hard.
While the business unionism model
may still work for many existing
unionised workplaces, it prevents
unions from embracing new models
of organising.
The “union zone” in our matrix
comprises most of these traditional
workplaces.  Not surprisingly,
unions became comfortable with
and used to this model, even as its
incidence dwindled.  It is
understandable why unions
themselves were less than
enthusiastic to take on organising in
the “non-union zone,” which has
been growing for more than 30
years.
Here is what makes workers in the
non-union zones so unattractive to
organise:
Workers in the upper left workers
are not employees at all so unions
have no recourse to collective
bargaining law.5  This does not
mean that unionisation is impossible
but in the absence of collective
bargaining law, a very high level of
commitment and resources by the
union is required to organise such
workers.  Without the requisite
change in outlook and commitment,
unions will have little promise of
success with this group.  Yet the
potential for organising here could
be great.
What about the upper right?
Unions might like to have these
workers as members because they
are highly skilled, earn high
salaries (and thus can pay high
union dues).  However, those
workers do not generally clamour
for unionisation.  They have too
much individual bargaining power.
As well, these workers are more
concerned with individual rather
than collective benefits.  The concept
of conducting individual
negotiations is foreign to unions’
sensibilities.  Moreover it simply
takes a lot more time and trouble to
negotiate individual benefits
compared to collective benefits.
As for the bottom portion of the
matrix, these workplaces are marked
by small size, dispersion, hostile
employers willing to fight against
unions, often past the point of
rationality and staffed by employees
often with weak attachment to the
labour market, who are easily
intimidated or sweet-talked (or
both) by their employers.  Even
where such workers are keen to be
organised (and this is not always a
certainty) organising them is very
difficult.  Moreover, even when the
union is successful in winning
certification, the first collective
agreement can be an elusive target.
Employers in this area often force
unions into set-piece battles for the
first contract.  But because the
workplaces can be so isolated, it is
difficult to win these strikes.
Collective bargaining law and
labour relations boards usually insist
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that the most appropriate bargaining
unit is the single workplace, making
it very difficult for unions to build
effective combinations of
workplaces for collective bargaining.
Even if the union is successful in
negotiating the first collective
agreement, the servicing costs can be
very high, sometimes even
outweighing the income that can be
obtained from the low dues.
It is not hard to understand why
unions themselves are very leery of
organising in this area.
THE DILEMMA FOR UNIONS
The biggest dilemma for unions is
that in the Canadian economy the
union zone is shrinking while the
non-union zone is growing.  Those
areas of employment that are
shrinking are the smokestack
industries and large workplaces of
the past.  Three fast-growing areas
of employment are contract work
(upper left), high skill-high tech
work (upper right) and low-skill
services and small manufacturing
work (bottom.
Unions have no choice.  If they
wish to survive and prosper, they
need to organise in the non-union
zone.  While all three factors are
working against unionisation in the
non-union zone, unions will have to
overcome them.
NOTES
1. The two authors claim that a similar but
unreported Canadian poll showed very
similar results.
2. In all of this, I am using the term
“employ” in its widest sense and not
denoting merely the legal employment
relationship.  Those who “employ” labour
may do so through various forms of legal
relationship, from a formal contract of
employment to a contract of service.  In
this sense, even workers who are
independent contractors are “employed”
by a person or organization who wants to
use their services.
3. One recalls that it was not in laissez-faire
Britain that these were first introduced,
but rather in those countries eager to catch
up and overtake Britain in industrial
might.  The United States began taxing
citizens to provide secondary education in
the 1820s.  German Chancellor Bismarck
introduced a range of “welfare” measures
in the 1880s.
4. The “Wagner Model” is named after the
National Labour Relations (or Wagner)
Act introduced during US President
Roosevelt’s New Deal.
5. That is, unless the government passes a
law specifically giving them this right, and
that is very rare.  The governments of
Quebec and Canada have established laws
that give individual artists, musicians,
actors and the like, who usually act as
independent contractors, the right to
group together and name those who use
their services as “employers.”  The
employers then have a duty, similar to
labour law, to meet and negotiate with the
workers.  Ata bargaining impasse, the law
gives either party the right to commence
pressure actions, such as strikes or
lockouts.
74   JUST LABOUR vol. 3 (Fall 2003)                                                                                Debates
REFERENCES
Brieger, Peter. 2003. “Unionized workers less
happy at work.” National Post. Sept. 3
online edition.
Burawoy, M. 1985. The Politics of Production.
London: Verso.
Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing
Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under
Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W.
Craig Riddell, 2003. "Unionization and
Wage Inequality: A Comparative Study of
the U.S, the U.K., and Canada," NBER
Working Paper 9473. Washington: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Chun, Jennifer. "Flexible Despotisms: The
Intensification of Insecurity and
Uncertainty in the Lives of Silicon Valley's
High-Tech Assembly Workers." in Rick
Baldoz, Charles Koeber and Philip Kraft,
eds. The Critical Study of Work: Labor,
Technology and Global Production.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Collinson, David. 1994 “Strategies of
Resistance: Power, knowledge and
subjectivity in the workplace” in ed.
Jermier et al. Resistance and Power in
Organizations. New York and London:
Routledge.
Corcoran, Terence. 2003. “Poll finds deep
divide on unions.”  National Post.  Sept. 2
online edition.
Edwards, P.K. 1986. Conflict at Work: A
Materialist Analysis of Workplace Relations.
Oxford: Blackwell
Freeman, Richard B. and Joel Rogers. 1999.
What Workers Want. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Godard, John. 2000. Industrial Relations: The
Economy and Society. Toronto: Captus.
Haiven, Larry. 1994. "Workplace Discipline
in International Comparative Perspective"
in Jacques Bélanger, Paul Edwards and
Larry Haiven, eds., Workplace Industrial
Relations and the Global Challenge.  Ithaca:
ILR Press.
Haiven, Larry. 1991. Hegemony and the
Workplace: The Case of Arbitration. In
Regulating Labour: The State, Neo-
Conservatism and Industrial Relations.
Haiven, McBride and Shields, eds.
Toronto: Garamond, 79-117
Manwaring, T. and S. Wood. 1985. “The
Ghost in the Labour Process.” In Job
Redesign: Critical Perspectives on the Labour
Process (D. Knights, H. Willmott, and D.
Collinson, eds.) Aldershot: Gower.171-196.
Milhar, Fazil.  2003a.  “Leaders out of step
with members.” National Post. Sept. 2
online edition.
………….2003b.  “Canadians prefer the My
Way ethos.” National Post. Sept. 3 online
edition.
Rodger, N.A.M. 1996. The Wooden World: An
Anatomy of the Georgian Navy.  New York:
Norton.
